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Abstract. 
Strategic environmental policy games are usually based on simultaneous decision making and reach 
the conclusion that the policy choices are strategic substitutes. Empirical evidence, however, shows 
that the introduction of a regulatory instrument usually follows a consecutive pattern that is best de-
scribed as policy diffusion. To introduce policy diffusion into to a strategic environmental policy game 
we transform the typical model setup into a Stackelberg game in which we analyze the policy deci-
sions of two governments when one can commit to its choice. We find that the well-known trade-off 
between rent-seeking and the internalisation of negative externalities from pollution is mitigated when 
policy diffusion takes place. 
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1. Introduction 
Strategic environmental policy games usually investigate simultaneous decision-making in a 
Cournot setup and predict a suboptimal internalisation of the negative externality (Conrad 
1993, Barrett 1994, Simpson & Bradford 1996, Ulph & Ulph 1996). Simultaneous decision-
making, however, does not find much empirical support when the introduction of environ-
mental policy instruments is concerned. Rather, the establishment of novel regulatory instru-
ments, such as emission taxes, follows a consecutive pattern (Busch & Jörgens 2005). If this 
spread of policies happens in an uncoordinated but interdependent manner it is referred to as 
policy diffusion (Elkins & Simmons 2005). The latter therefore defines a process by which a 
political innovation disseminates over time among countries (Rogers 2003). Translated into a 
strategic environmental policy game the diffusion of policies implies that at least one gov-
ernment is able to precommit to its policy decision and thus acts as a first-mover. The conven-
tional setup then turns into a Stackelberg game in which the policy choice of the potential 
adopter depends on the first-mover’s initial decision. If the domestic government actually 
commits to a tax rate it signals the foreign government that taxing foreign emissions will not 
create a comparative disadvantage for the foreign firm. Modelling policy diffusion therefore 
entails the question whether the governments’ incentive to make rent-seeking for the firms 
located under their respective jurisdiction possible will be weakened. 
2.  The model 
We investigate a Cournot game in which two firms that are located in two different countries 
produce a homogenous consumption good. Producing the good entails the creation of envi-
ronmentally harmful emissions. Each country also harbours a welfare-maximising govern-
mental agency that aims at internalising the external effect of pollution. To do so it sets a tax 
rate per unit of emission. 
The game comprises three stages. In the third stage the firms choose their equilibrium quanti-
ties and take the choice variables of the other stages as given. The output is then sold on a 
third country’s market which allows for the omission of consumer surplus in the welfare func-
tions.2 In the second stage the foreign government chooses its tax rate which, in turn, depends 
on the domestic tax rate. The latter is fixed in stage 1 which implies that the domestic gov-
ernment expects its policy choice to diffuse to the foreign government. Hence, the domestic 
government accounts for policy diffusion when making its decision. This Stackelberg config-
uration then can be solved via backward induction beginning with stage 3.   
Throughout the game subscripts i,j refer to domestic (d) and foreign (f). The firms face a 
downward-sloping inverse demand function ( )fd yyp ,  for the consumption good on the third 
country market with iy  denoting the output of firm i which implies ( ) 0<⋅′p . The emissions 
of firm i are denoted ie . Emissions ie  equal output iy , that is, 1=∂∂ ii ye . Moreover, firms 
face the cost functions ( )iii ytc ,  in which it  stands for the tax rate in country i. The cost func-
tions have the standard properties ( ) 0;0 22 =∂∂>∂∂ iiii ycyc
 
and 
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( ) 0;0 22 ≤∂∂>∂∂ iiii tctc . Furthermore, environmental harm is captured in the convex 
damage function ( )ii yD  with 0>∂∂ ii yD  and ( ) 022 ≥∂∂ ii yD . 
 
In the third stages of the game the firms choose their optimal quantities which maximise the 
according profit function: 
 
 
( ) ( )iiiijiiy ytcyyypi ,, −⋅=pimax  (1) 
 
Maximising (1) will yield optimal quantities as functions of both the domestic and foreign tax 
rates from stages 2 and 1. Reinserting the optimal quantities from stage 3 into (1) yields the 
objective function in the second stage: 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )dfdfdfdfdffdfdff
t
tttytttttyDtttW
f
,,, ⋅+−= pimax  (2) 
 
Maximising (2) yields the equilibrium foreign tax rate which, in turn, depends on the domes-
tic tax rate. Finally, in the first stage the domestic government sets the optimal tax rate by 
maximising its welfare function: 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )dfddddfdfddfddd
t
tttyttttyDtttW
d
,,, ⋅+−= pimax  (3) 
 
3.  Optimal Decisions 
In stage 3 both firms choose their output quantities. They do so by differentiating (1) with 
respect to quantities. This yields the following first-order conditions which implicitly define 
the Nash-Equilibrium in quantities (assuming that an interior solution exists): 
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First-order condition (4) implies the reaction functions ( )jii yyy~ = . Equilibrium quantities can 
therefore be written as ( )jiii t,tyy = . 
 
In stage 2 the foreign government sets its tax rate which, by definition, depends on the domes-
tic tax rate. Differentiating (2) with respect to the foreign tax rate yields the following first-
order condition which implicitly defines the Nash-equilibrium in the foreign tax rate (again, 
assuming an interior solution): 
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Solving first-order condition (5) for the foreign tax rate yields: 
 
Policy Diffusion in a simple Stackelberg Game 
 
 
4
 
( )








⋅
∂
∂
⋅
∂
⋅∂
−⋅
∂∂
+
∂
∂
= f
f
d
dfff
f
f yt
y
y
p
tyy
D
t
1
 (6) 
 
The foreign optimal regulation schedule (6) replicates the standard result that arises in simul-
taneous Nash-Cournot games, namely the emergence of ecological dumping. The strategic 
rent-shifting effect in the parenthesis in combination with the negative multiplier on the RHS 
in (6) is negative which results in a suboptimal internalisation of the negative externality from 
environmental harm. 
 
In stage 1 the domestic government sets its tax rate in expectation of policy diffusion. To do 
so it maximises its welfare function with respect to the domestic tax rate: 
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Solving first-order condition (7) for the domestic tax rate yields: 
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Whether the common rent-shifting effect is intensified or weakened by the novel second term 
in the second parenthesis depends on the sign of df tt ∂∂ : for 0<∂∂ df tt  the tax decisions 
are strategic substitutes, for 0>∂∂ df tt  they are strategic complements. In the first case the 
novel strategic effect is negative and thereby intensifies the downward pressure on the tax rate 
initiated by the rent-shifting effect. This result seems only plausible when the foreign country 
can gain more from the transfer of polluting production capacities from the domestic into its 
territory compared to the reduction in environmental harm which hints at a low foreign dam-
age parameter. Furthermore, the domestic government must base its decision on a substantial-
ly higher damage parameter otherwise it would not have committed itself to increasing the tax 
rate since it accounts for the foreign government’s decision. Hence, the strategic-substitutes-
case may only occur if a substantial asymmetry between the damage parameters exists so that 
pollution is only a marginal issue for the foreign country. 
The second case, in turn, describes policy diffusion which necessitates that the tax decisions 
are strategic complements. Although the internalisation of environmental harm remains 
suboptimal, the then positive novel strategic effect in the optimal regulation schedule (8) mit-
igates ecological dumping. The domestic tax rate in the Stackelberg-game with policy diffu-
sion will be higher compared to the domestic tax rate in a Cournot-Nash-game without policy 
diffusion (which is identical with regulation schedule (6)). Hence, in expectation of policy 
diffusion the unilateral setting of a tax rate yields a Pareto-improvement compared to the 
standard Nash-Cournot game due to the smaller extent of ecological dumping. 
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4.  Conclusions 
Including policy diffusion into a strategic environmental policy game shows that the standard 
result of a suboptimal internalization of the negative externality from environmental harm is 
mitigated when the tax decisions are strategic complements. While simultaneous decision 
making in an according one-period model inevitably entails the well-known race to the bot-
tom the domestic government’s opportunity to commit to its policy choice allows its foreign 
counterpart to break this downward spiral since the trade-off between rent-seeking and reduc-
ing emissions becomes less urgent. Thus, introducing the empirically corroborated theory of 
policy diffusion weakens the well-established trade-off between environmental regulation and 
competitiveness as long as the environmental problem is perceived to be substantial in both 
countries. 
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